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MaskingSelf-related stimuli, such as one’s own name or face, are processed faster and more accu-
rately than other types of stimuli. However, what remains unknown is at which stage of the
information processing hierarchy this preferential processing occurs. Our first aim was to
determine whether preferential self-processing involves mainly perceptual stages or also
post-perceptual stages. We found that self-related priming was stronger than other-
related priming only because of perceptual prime-target congruency. Our second aim
was to dissociate the role of conscious and unconscious factors in preferential self-
processing. To this end, we compared the ‘‘self” and ‘‘other” conditions in trials where
primes were masked or unmasked. In two separate experiments, we found that self-
related priming was stronger than other-related priming but only in the unmasked trials.
Together, our results suggest that preferential access to the self-concept occurs mainly at
the perceptual and conscious stages of the stimulus processing hierarchy.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-
NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The sound of our name usually signals some potentially important events, for example, that someone wants to warn us,
praise us, or to start a conversation with us. Thus, it is likely that through mechanisms of associative learning people start to
react to their name preferentially. That is, they react more quickly and accurately to their own name than to other people’s
names. Crucially, because one’s own name is heard countless times in everyday life, and because automaticity develops as a
function of repetition, this stimulus becomes processed in an unintentional, involuntary, and cognitively effortless manner.
Indeed, many studies support that the processing of self-relevant stimuli is preferential and largely automatic (Arnell,
Shapiro, & Sorensen, 1999; Bargh, 1982; Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin,
2004; Moray, 1959; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997; Wolford & Morrison, 1980; but see Breska, Israel, Maoz, Cohen,
& Ben-Shakhar, 2011; Devue, Van der Stigchel, Brédart, & Theeuwes, 2009; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003;
Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). Over the years, this automaticity of self-processing has been used as an argument that self-
related factors are influencing information processing at a very early level of the cognitive hierarchy and therefore shape
perceptions of the world and other people in a very profound way. Such early self-biases have important implications for
basic mechanisms of cognitive functioning, as well as for theories of implicit social cognition (e.g., Greenwald et al.,
2002). However, to the best of our knowledge, no existing studies have tracked the processing of self-relevant information
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cognitive hierarchy at which the self-prioritization actually occurs remains unknown.
The mental self-representation likely consists of stimulus-specific perceptual components, as well as more abstract
modality-independent components (e.g., Morin, 2006; Newen & Vogeley, 2003). Self-preferential processing at the percep-
tual level is a well-established phenomenon (Pannese & Hirsch, 2010; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), which also likely takes place
in some animals, e.g., dogs preferentially react to their own name. What is unclear, however, is whether preferential access to
self also occurs at the conceptual level. It has been shown that being exposed to one’s own odor and hearing or seeing one’s
own name facilitates the subsequent recognition of one’s own face. In contrast, these cross-modal priming effects were
absent for familiar and unknown faces (Platek, Thomson, & Gallup, 2004). This result suggests that preferential conceptual
processing is specific to self; however, other studies have shown that conceptual priming facilitates the recognition of any
familiar person, which undermines the specificity of preferential conceptual self-access (e.g., Boehm & Sommer, 2012;
Brédart, 2004). As a consequence, the precise role of post-perceptual factors in self-preferential processing is unknown.
Another issue that remains unknown is how conscious and unconscious factors contribute to the ‘‘self-prioritization
effect.” The majority of previous studies used only supraliminal presentations of stimuli. As a result, these studies could
not dissociate between aware and unaware aspects of self-preferential processing (e.g., Arnell et al., 1999; Brédart et al.,
2006; Tacikowski, Cygan, & Nowicka, 2014; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008). Several studies used subliminal presenta-
tions of stimuli and showed that the self-preferential processing occurs even if conscious access is largely reduced or elim-
inated (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; Pannese & Hirsch, 2010; Pfister, Pohl, Kiesel, & Kunde, 2012; Wentura,
Kulfanek, & Greve, 2005). However, the above studies did not compare aware and unaware self-effects directly; thus, it is
unclear whether (i) self-prioritization occurs mainly at the unconscious level, without additional self-prioritization at the
conscious level, or (ii) whether self-preference occurs independently at both levels of information processing.
The present study had two aims: (i) to determine whether preferential access to self-representation occurs only at the
perceptual level or also at the semantic stages of information processing; and (ii) to determine how conscious and uncon-
scious factors contribute to preferential self-processing. We used a 2  2  2 factorial design, with ‘‘person” (self vs. other),
‘‘type of priming” (perceptual vs. semantic), and ‘‘masking” (masked vs. unmasked) as the factors. The experimental task
required participants to decide whether stimuli (e.g., names, surnames, dates of birth, or nationality codes) shown on a com-
puter screen at the end of each trial (targets) were related to themselves or to another person (Fig. 1A and B). Before each
target, a prime was briefly presented that was either congruent (i.e., self–self or other–other) or incongruent (i.e., self–other
or other–self) with the following target. The prime-target congruency was based either on perceptual features (e.g., own-
name–own-name) or on semantic features (e.g., own-name–own-surname). Conscious processing of primes was manipu-
lated using a visual masking method. In half of the trials, the primes were immediately preceded and followed by visual
masks (‘‘XYXYX” strings), making the aware processing of these primes difficult. In the other half of the trials, no mask
was used, making the aware processing of these primes easy compared with the masked primes. All other aspects of the
stimuli presentation (e.g., location, duration, task-demands, etc.) were identical between the masked and unmasked trials,
as well as between perceptual and semantic trials. Our dependent variable was the degree of different types of priming,
which was calculated as the difference between RTs from respective incongruent and congruent trials.
We hypothesized that if preferential access to the self-representation occurs at the conceptual level, then we should find a
significantly stronger semantic priming in the ‘‘self” than in the ‘‘other” condition. Furthermore, we reasoned that if self-
preference occurs both at the unconscious and conscious levels, then we should find a significant interaction between ‘‘per-
son” and ‘‘masking” factors, where self-specific priming (‘‘self” > ‘‘other”) is present in the masked trials but is even stronger
in the unmasked trials. In contrast, finding the main effect of ‘‘person” (‘‘self” > ‘‘other”) without an interaction effect would
suggest that preferential processing of self-relevant information occurs mainly at the unconscious level and that this effect is
only ‘‘carried over” to the conscious level.
2. Experiment I
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four naïve, right-handed subjects (mean age: 27 ± 5, nine females) participated in this study. All participants
were healthy, reported no history of psychiatric illness or neurologic disorder, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
All participants gave their written informed consent before the start of the experiment. The Regional Ethical Review Board of
Stockholm approved the study.
2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
As experimental stimuli, we used first names, surnames, dates of birth, and nationality codes that referred either to a par-
ticipant (self-related) or to an unknown person (other-related). Before the study each participant was asked whether he or
she knows anyone with the same name and surname as the ‘‘other” in their stimulus set; none of the participants did.
Nationality was indicated by a three-letter code (e.g., ‘‘FRA” for France) according to the ISO 3166 norm. Dates were given
in the ‘‘YYYY/ MM/DD” format. All words were written in white capital letters (Arial font; size ranging from 3  1 to
Fig. 1. The paradigm and the results of Experiment I. (A) In perceptual priming trials, primes and targets belonged to the same stimulus category, e.g.,
name–name, surname–surname, as indicated by orange circles. Orange triangles in the corners indicate the targets. The subject’s task was to decide
whether these stimuli were self- or other-related. (B) The semantic priming trials were analogous to perceptual ones, but primes and targets never belonged
to the same stimulus category, as indicated by orange circles and crosses, e.g., name–surname, date–name. (C) As expected, our masking procedure
significantly hindered the correct discrimination of primes. (D) We found that perceptual priming, but not semantic priming, was stronger in the ‘‘self” than
in the ‘‘other” condition, which suggests that low-level (physical) features contribute to preferential processing of self-related information. (E) We also
found that priming was significantly stronger for self- than for other-related stimuli but only in the unmasked trials (significant interaction). (For
interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Weber contrast: 120). Primes and targets were presented in the same spatial location, which was the center of the screen.
The size of self- and other-related stimuli was very closely matched (names and surnames had the same number of letters, as
did the dates and nationality codes). In addition, the subject’s own name and the other person’s name were matched in terms
of gender.
Each trial began with a fixation point (i.e., a white ‘‘+”) that was followed by a prime and then a target (Fig. 1A and B). In
half of the trials, primes were immediately preceded by forward masks and immediately followed by backward masks. The
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get onset to the end of each trial). Fig. 1A and B provide specific information about the onsets, durations, and intervals
between stimuli. Recordings performed with a high-speed camera (1000 Hz, model Exilim EX-ZR100, Casio Computer
Ltd., Shibuya, Japan) confirmed that forward masks, primes, and backward masks were displayed for 20 ± 1 ms and that
the intervals between them were also 20 ± 1 ms long.
We used perceptual and semantic priming procedures (Fig. 1A and B, respectively). In perceptual priming, primes and
targets belonged to the same stimulus category (e.g., name–name, surname–surname), whereas in semantic priming they
belonged to different categories (e.g., name–surname, date–name). This manipulation allowed us to test whether preferen-
tial access to the self-concept occurs at the semantic or only at the perceptual stages of information processing (Schacter &
Buckner, 1998). Including semantic trials also helped us to accurately assess the visibility of masked primes. That is, if all
trials were perceptual trials, subjects could have guessed the identity of primes based on the identity of the targets, indepen-
dently from conscious awareness (e.g., ‘‘I did not see the prime, but because the target was A and because I saw that the
prime and the target differed, the prime had to be B”). Crucially, being aware of a physical difference between two stimuli
is not the same as being aware of what these stimuli actually are. Intermixing semantic and perceptual trials prevented such
a response bias (i.e., physical difference between primes and targets was no longer informative about the identity of the
primes). Notably, in perceptual trials, each stimulus pair (name–name; surname–surname; date–date; nationality–national
ity) was used the same number of times (6 repetitions within each trial type). Similarly, in semantic trials, each category
combination was equiprobable (12 possible combinations, each repeated twice within each trial type).
In sum, we used a 2  2  2  2 design with ‘‘person” (self vs. other), ‘‘type of priming” (perceptual vs. semantic), ‘‘mask-
ing” (masked vs. unmasked), and ‘‘congruency” (congruent vs. incongruent) as the factors. Thus, there were 16 trial types,
and each trial type was repeated 24 times. A total of 384 trials were presented in two separate sessions in pseudo-
random order (not more than three consecutive repetitions of a self- or other-related targets). In one session, we presented
only masked trials, whereas in the other session, we presented only unmasked trials. The point of separating these trials was
to prevent subjects from paying too much attention to masked stimuli because top-down attention has been shown to facil-
itate conscious access (Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002). The order of ‘‘masked” and ‘‘unmasked” sessions was counter-
balanced across participants. Each session lasted approximately 10 min, and there was a short break in the middle of each
session (1 min). There was also a break between two sessions (2 min).
During the priming sessions, subjects were told to ignore prime stimuli and respond only to targets. The task was to dis-
criminate whether the target in each trial was self- or other-related. The ‘‘LEFT-CTRL” and the ‘‘NUM-ENTER” buttons on a
standard keyboard were used to indicate responses with button presses made with the left and the right index fingers,
respectively. The key assignment was counterbalanced across participants. The instructions emphasized that responses
should be as fast and as accurate as possible. After reading the instructions, the subjects underwent a practice session (a ser-
ies of 16 trials, two repetitions of each trial type). Practice trials were identical to actual trials for the upcoming session but
included additional feedback (i.e., ‘‘CORRECT,” ‘‘INCORRECT,” or ‘‘TOO LATE!”) presented at the end of each trial. None of the
subjects reported problems complying with the task.
During the actual study, the inter-trial intervals were 0.5, 1, or 1.5 s. The aim for using this ‘‘temporal jitter” was to reduce
the effects of habituation possibly caused by a monotonous pace of stimuli presentation. Intervals of different lengths were
equally distributed across 384 trials. All stimuli were displayed on an LCD computer screen (DELL S2409W; Dell Inc., Round
Rock, Texas, USA) with a 50-Hz refresh rate and a 1920  1080 resolution. The viewing distance was similar for all partic-
ipants (chin rest placed 70 cm away from the screen). Presentation software (version 16.2, Neurobehavioral Systems,
Inc., Albany, CA) was used to control stimuli display and to record each participant’s responses.
After completing both priming sessions, the participants underwent forced-choice visibility tests. These tests were
designed to assess the subjects’ ability to recognize masked and unmasked primes. Compared to priming sessions, the vis-
ibility tests differed in only two ways. (i) The participants were asked to decide whether primes, not targets, were self- or
other-related, and (ii) each trial type was repeated 12 instead of 24 times, so the total of 192 trials was presented in two
five-minute sessions (1-min break in between). As in the priming session, masked and unmasked trials were presented sep-
arately. Each session started with an instruction and a practice session (a series of 16 trials, 2 repetitions of each trial type).
The instructions emphasized that the participant was unsure, he or she should try to guess the correct response. The instruc-
tions also emphasized that the speed of responding is not crucial in visibility tests. The key assignment in the visibility tests
was always the same as in the priming sessions.
2.1.3. Data analysis
First, we sought to determine whether masked primes were indeed consciously perceived with more difficulty than
unmasked primes. Consistent with a long tradition of psychophysical studies, processing of a stimulus is regarded as una-
ware if subjects are not able to report this stimulus with accuracy greater than chance. To test this criterion, we calculated
the so-called sensitivity indexes (d0) based on the visibility test data (Wickens, 2002). These d0 were calculated separately for
masked and unmasked primes and were contrasted (i) against ‘‘0” (chance level) and (ii) against each other (to determine
whether masking made aware access more difficult).
In the analysis of the priming sessions, we first sorted RTs from all correct trials according to trial type. Second, we
excluded plausible outliers. That is, we excluded trials in which RTs were 1.5 of the inter-quartile range above or below
the third and the first quartiles, respectively (NB. Only 4 ± 4% of trials were removed in this procedure). Outlier-free RTs were
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were calculated as the difference between RTs in incongruent and congruent trials divided by the summed RTs from these
trials: PI = (RTincong.  RTcong.)/(RTincong. + RTcong.). Unlike the classical priming coefficient (i.e., a simple difference between
RTincong. > RTcong.), PI ratio accounts for the fact that priming depends on the overall RTs (Ewbank et al., 2014). For instance,
the same priming value of 20 ms indicates a different effect size if the overall RT is 1300 ms than when the overall RT is
900 ms. In the former case, 20 ms corresponds to a weaker priming than in the latter case. This additional control provided
by PIs is particularly important in our study, as we wanted to directly compare conscious and unconscious effects without
biases related to, for example, the presence of masks that likely delay the overall RTs. Importantly, the sign of PI values is
informative, with positive values indicating behavioral facilitation, zero indicating no priming, and negative values indicat-
ing negative priming. Notably, we analyzed our data also using simple priming coefficients, but this control analysis showed
the exact same pattern of statistical results as the analysis on PIs.
In general, reducing the ‘‘congruency factor” simplified our analysis (interpreting a four-way interaction could be
challenging) and excluded possible confounds (as congruent and incongruent trials were closely matched within each con-
dition, contrasting them in the first step of analysis eliminated any between-condition nuisance differences, for example, due
to the presence or absence of masks or due to different motor requirements). Thus, we had eight experimental conditions:
self_perceptual_masked; other_perceptual_masked; self_perceptual_unmasked; other_perceptual_unmasked;
self_semantic_masked; other_semantic_masked; self_semantic_unmasked; and other_semantic_unmasked. In our main
analysis, we used a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA to compare the degree of priming for different conditions. This
ANOVA had the following factors: ‘‘person” (self vs. other), ‘‘type of priming” (perceptual vs. semantic), and ‘‘masking”
(masked vs. unmasked). We used IBM SPSS software (version 22, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.) to perform all statistical analyses.
2.2. Results
Fig. 1C shows the sensitivity indexes (d0) for masked and unmasked primes in both types of priming. Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests revealed that the distributions of d0 for masked-perceptual and unmasked-semantic primes were non-Gaussian
(p = 0.037 and p = 0.005, respectively), whereas d0 for unmasked-perceptual and masked-semantic primes did not deviate
from the normal distribution (p = 0.133 and p > 0.2, respectively). We found that d0 for all types of primes were significantly
higher than chance: masked-perceptual (p < 0.0005, one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test), unmasked-perceptual
(p < 0.0005, one-sample t-test), masked-semantic (p < 0.0005, one-sample t-test), and unmasked-semantic (p < 0.0005,
one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test). The related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed that d0 for masked primes
were significantly lower than d0 for unmasked primes (perceptual: p < 0.0005; semantic: p < 0.0005). Together, these results
indicate that, even if we did not create a completely unaware context of information processing, our masking procedure was
highly efficient in manipulating the level of aware processing, which is sufficient for the purpose of our study (see Section 4).
Next, we checked whether the masking procedure was equally effective for self- and other-related primes. One might sus-
pect, for example, that due to its high familiarity and behavioral relevance, the subject’s own name could ‘‘pop up” and be
consciously perceived despite the masking procedure. To test this possibility, we analyzed accuracy rates from the visibility
tests. Surprisingly, we found that participants were actually worse at correctly recognizing self-related than other-related
masked primes (mean accuracy: 62 ± 2% and 72 ± 1%, respectively; p < 0.0005; Wilcoxon signed rank test). Future studies
are needed to validate this unexpected finding; however, it clearly indicates that, in the present study, self-related primes
did not overcome the masking procedure to a greater extent than other-related primes.
As for our main research questions, we compared the degree of priming between experimental conditions using ANOVA.
However, we first assessed the accuracy rates and normality of priming indexes. Accuracy rates for all trial types were very
high (between 87% and 98%), which shows that subjects had no problem complying with the task. Priming indexes did not
deviate from the normal distribution for any of the conditions (Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests). The ANOVA showed a main
effect for the ‘‘type of priming,” (F1, 23 = 70.16; p < 0.0005; g2 = 0.75), ‘‘masking,” (F1, 23 = 34.68; p < 0.0005; g2 = 0.6),
and ‘‘person,” (F1, 23 = 21.11; p < 0.0005; g2 = 0.48). In addition, the ANOVA showed interactions for ‘‘type of
priming”  ‘‘masking,” (F1, 23 = 16.13; p = 0.001; g2 = 0.41), ‘‘type of priming”  ‘‘person,” (F1, 23 = 8.07; p = 0.009;
g2 = 0.26), and ‘‘masking”  ‘‘person” (F1, 23 = 6.25; p = 0.02; g2 = 0.21). The three-way interaction was not significant
(F1, 23 = 0.53; p = 0.48; g2 = 0.022). Next, we performed post hoc tests (paired t-tests, two-tailed) for the interactions includ-
ing the factor ‘‘person” (our main interest in this study).
Decomposition of the ‘‘type of priming”  ‘‘person” interaction (Fig. 1D) showed that the ‘‘self” > ‘‘other” difference was
significant in the perceptual trials (t23 = 4.91; p < 0.0005) but not significant in the semantic trials (t23 = 1.17; p = 0.26).
Therefore, the perceptual factors were likely the main contributor to the preferential processing of self-related stimuli
(see Section 4). In turn, decomposition of the ‘‘masking” ‘‘person” interaction (Fig. 1E) showed that the difference between
the ‘‘self-masked” and ‘‘other-masked” conditions was non-significant (t23 = 1.41; p = 0.17), whereas the difference between
the ‘‘self-unmasked” and ‘‘other-unmasked” conditions was highly significant (t23 = 4.75; p < 0.0005). This finding suggests
that conscious factors significantly contributed to the preferential processing of self-related information and these factors
played a more important role than the unconscious ones.
In sum, Experiment I suggests that the preferential processing of self-relevant information occurs mainly because of per-
ceptual and conscious factors. It is noteworthy that we did not find evidence for the ‘‘unconscious self-preferential effect,”
even though previous studies have supported it (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Geng, Zhang, Li, Tao, & Xu, 2012; Pfister et al.,
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using a more familiar and more automatically processed set of stimuli. We assumed that if any self-related stimulus is pro-
cessed in a truly unaware way, then this stimulus would probably be the subject’s own name, which appears countless times
in everyday life. Because in Experiment I we analyzed pooled responses to different kinds of biographical material, the auto-
maticity of processing one’s own-name could have been ‘‘diluted” and therefore failed to produce a significant effect. Thus, in
Experiment II, responses to names and to different kinds of biographic stimuli were separated. Similar to Experiment I, we
hypothesized that if preferential processing of one’s own name occurs mainly at the unconscious level, then we should find
only a main effect of ‘‘person” in our factorial design but no interaction. In contrast, a greater difference in ‘‘self” > ‘‘other” in
the unmasked trials compared to the masked trials (the same interaction as in Experiment I) would suggest that both uncon-
scious and conscious factors contribute to the preferential processing of one’s own name. In Experiment II we also decreased
the duration that primes were presented to further hinder aware processing of masked stimuli.
3. Experiment II
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four naïve, right-handed subjects (mean age: 27 ± 5, ten females) participated in this study. All participants were
healthy, reported no history of psychiatric illness or neurological disorder, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
One participant was excluded because of an excessively low accuracy rate in one session (approximately 50%). The mean
age of the remaining 23 participants (10 females) was 27 ± 5. All participants gave their written informed consent before
the start of the experiment. The Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm approved the study.
3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
As experimental stimuli we used first names, initials, dates of birth, years of birth, and age, that were either self- or other-
related (again, the ‘‘other” was a person who the participants had no pre-existing knowledge about). We did not use nation-
ality codes in this experiment because they might be seen as part of the ‘‘collective self” (‘‘me” as a group member) rather
than as part of the ‘‘individual self” like the rest of our stimuli. Dates of birth were presented as ‘‘MM/DD,” whereas birth
years were presented as ‘‘YYYY”. All stimuli were written in white capital letters (Arial font; size ranging from 2  1 to
8  1 degrees of visual angle) and were presented centrally on a black background (the same luminance and contrast as
in Experiment I). The subject’s own name and the other’s name were matched in terms of gender and number of letters.
The structure of a single trial was the same as in Experiment I (Fig. 1A); however, in this experiment, forward masks, primes,
and backward masks were presented only for 12 ± 2 ms with 15 ± 2 ms intervals (these exact durations were confirmed by
measurements with the same high-speed camera used in Experiment I).
Our main aim in Experiment II was to test the effect of awareness on name processing vs. biographic material. Therefore,
we did not include perceptual vs. semantic priming manipulation, and all trials were perceptual priming trials. Thus, we used
a 2  2  2  2 design with the following factors: ‘‘type of stimuli” (name vs. biographic), ‘‘masking” (masked vs. unmasked),
‘‘person” (self vs. other), and ‘‘congruency” (congruent vs. incongruent). A total of 384 trials (i.e., 16 trial types, each trial type
repeated 24 times) were presented in a pseudo-random order in four separate sessions (i.e., names-masked, names-
unmasked, biographic-masked, and biographic-unmasked). The order of these sessions was fully counterbalanced across
the participants (each of the four possible sequences of sessions applied to 6 participants). Each session lasted approximately
4 min, and there were short breaks between the sessions (1 min). In the ‘‘biographic session,” each stimulus category (date,
initials, year, and age) was repeated exactly six times, whereas in the ‘‘names session” each name was repeated 24 times.
Subjects were seated in front of a computer screen (chin rest placed 70 cm away from the computer screen) and were
instructed to discriminate whether the target stimuli were related to themselves or to another person. The instructions
always informed the subjects what kind of stimuli would be used in the subsequent session (names or biographic). Button
presses of the ‘‘LEFT-CTRL” and ‘‘NUM-ENTER” buttons with the left and the right index fingers were used to indicate
responses. The key assignment was counterbalanced across participants. The task instructions emphasized both the accuracy
and speed of responses. Because the subjects in Experiment I had no problem complying with the task, we did not include
practice sessions in Experiment II.
The inter-trial intervals were 1, 1.5, or 2 s and were evenly distributed across 384 trials. The stimuli were displayed on the
same computer monitor that was used in Experiment I. However, to allow briefer stimuli presentations, we changed the
refresh rate to 75-Hz and the resolution to 1280  1024. The fact that our high-speed camera measurements showed
12 ± 2 ms for the stimuli durations and 15 ± 2 ms for the intervals (see the text above), instead of 13.3 ± 2 for both, as
expected from using a 75-Hz refresh rate, is probably because of the loss of luminance for the camera at the onset and offset
of the stimuli presentation. The stimuli durations were matched across experimental conditions.
After completing all four priming sessions, participants performed four visibility tests (24 trials in each trial type). The
visibility tests were the same as the priming sessions, but subjects responded to primes rather than to targets. Presentation
software (version 16.2, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Albany, CA) was used to present stimuli and to record responses.
P. Tacikowski, H.H. Ehrsson / Consciousness and Cognition 41 (2016) 139–149 1453.1.3. Data analysis
Analyses of d0 and RTs were the same as those performed in Experiment I. The priming data analysis included the
following eight conditions: self_names_masked; other_names_masked; self_names_unmasked; other_names_unmasked;
self_biographic_masked; other_biographic_masked; self_biographic_unmasked; and other_biographic_unmasked. After
sorting single-trial RTs from correct trials, we excluded outliers using the same method as in Experiment I (only 6 ± 6% of
trials were removed in this procedure). Then, we tested the normality of distributions and calculated subject-specific
priming indexes for each condition. Finally, we ran a three-way ANOVA with the factors ‘‘type of stimuli” (names vs.
biographic), ‘‘masking” (masked vs. unmasked), and ‘‘person” (self vs. other). All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS
software (version 22, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).
3.2. Results
Fig. 2A shows the data from the visibility tests. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests indicated that d0 for masked-names and
masked-biographic primes deviated from normality (p < 0.0005 and p = 0.003, respectively), whereas d0 for unmasked-
names and unmasked-biographic primes did not (p > 0.2 in both tests). The one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed
that d0 for masked-names and masked-biographic primes did not differ from chance level (p = 0.26 and p = 0.05, respec-
tively). In turn, correct recognition of unmasked-names and unmasked-biographic primes was above chance (p < 0.0005
in both one-sample t-tests). In both sessions, d0 for masked primes were significantly lower than d0 for unmasked primes
(p < 0.0005 in both related-samples Wilcoxon signed rank tests). In general, these results indicate that masking was highly
effective in hindering conscious access.
We also checked whether self-related primes were masked equally well as other-related primes. The accuracy rates from
visibility tests were as follows (mean accuracy in % ± SEM): self-name-masked (50 ± 3); other-name-masked (55 ± 4); self-
biographic-masked (48 ± 4); and other-biographic-masked (54 ± 4). Wilcoxon signed rank tests did not show significant dif-
ferences (self- vs. other-name: p = 0.89; self- vs. other-biographic: p = 0.44). These results suggest that masking was similarly
effective for self- and other-related primes.
Our main analysis, the three-way ANOVA, compared the degree of priming between experimental conditions. Accuracy
rates for all trial types were very high (between 94% and 98%). Priming indexes did not deviate from the normal distribution
for most of the conditions (p > 0.2 in all Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests). The only exception was the SHN condition (p = 0.016);
however, because ANOVA is robust against the violation of normality assumption (Khan & Rayner, 2003), we still used this
parametric test, as it closely matches our parametric design. The ANOVA showed the main effect of ‘‘masking,” (F1, 22 = 42.62;Fig. 2. Results of Experiment II. (A) Masking procedure was highly effective both for names and for biographic stimuli. (B) Priming data showed the same
pattern of results as in Experiment I (compare with Fig. 1E) suggesting that preferential access to the self-concept is mainly due to conscious processes.
(C) Results of only the ‘‘names” session showed that even the subject’s name (i.e., probably the most automatically processed self-related stimulus) did not
trigger significant subliminal self-specific effects.
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(F1, 22 = 6.85; p = 0.016; g2 = 0.24). The main effect of ‘‘type of stimuli,” (F1, 22 = 2.4; p = 0.14; g2 = 0.01), ‘‘masking”  ‘‘type
of stimuli” interaction, (F1, 22 = 0.38; p = 0.54; g2 = 0.017), ‘‘person”  ‘‘type of stimuli” interaction, (F1, 22 = 1.4; p = 0.25;
g2 = 0.06), and the three-way interaction, (F1, 22 = 1.51; p = 0.23; g2 = 0.064) were non-significant.
Post hoc analysis (paired t-tests, two-tailed) for the ‘‘masking”  ‘‘person” interaction (our main focus in this study)
showed that in the masked trials, the self- and other-related priming did not differ significantly (t22 = 0.65; p = 0.52), whereas
in the unmasked trials, the self-related priming was stronger than the other-related priming (t22 = 3.28; p = 0.003). These
results closely resemble those obtained in Experiment I (compare Figs. 1E and 2B) and suggest that (i) preferential access
to the self-concept is related mainly to aware factors and (ii) that one’s own name is not an exception to this rule.
Finally, to further confirm the role of conscious factors in the processing of one’s own name, we ran a two-way ANOVA
only for the ‘‘names” session. This analysis showed a main effect of ‘‘masking” (F1, 22 = 21.17; p < 0.0005; g2 = 0.49) and the
‘‘masking”  ‘‘person” interaction (F1, 22 = 5.3; p = 0.031; g2 = 0.19). Post hoc t-tests showed that there was no significant dif-
ference between the ‘‘self” and ‘‘other” conditions in the masked trials (t22 = 1.49; p = 0.15), but the self-related priming
was stronger than the other-related priming in the unmasked trials (t22 = 1.98; p = 0.06; a statistical trend) (Fig. 2C). These
results are analogous to the ones from a three-way ANOVA and suggest that the preferential processing of one’s own name is
mainly due to aware factors.
4. Discussion
The first aim of this study was to determine whether semantic factors contribute significantly to the preferential process-
ing of self-related stimuli. We did not find evidence to support this claim. Even though we found a robust self-prioritization
at the perceptual level, the semantic self-prioritization was non-significant. The second aim was to determine whether pref-
erential access to the self-concept occurs both at the conscious and unconscious levels of information processing or whether
this preference is mainly an unconscious phenomenon. In two separate experiments, we found that the self-specific effects
(‘‘self” > ‘‘other”) were stronger in the unmasked than in the masked trials, which indicates that awareness significantly con-
tributes to the preferential processing of self-related stimuli.
Our first main result suggests that preferential access to self-representation occurs mainly at the perceptual stages of
information processing. Notably, in congruent perceptual trials, primes and targets were physically identical and referred
to the same person (e.g., own-name–own-name), whereas in congruent semantic trials, primes and targets were physically
different even though they referred to the same person (e.g., own-name–own-surname). Thus, in perceptual trials, self-
related priming could have resulted from perceptual and/or semantic congruency, whereas in semantic trials, self-related
priming could have resulted only from semantic congruency. We found that the self-preferential effect (‘‘self” > ‘‘other”)
was stronger in perceptual trials than in semantic trials (see Fig. 1D). Because semantic congruency was present in both
contexts (see the above explanation), this interaction effect had to be driven specifically by perceptual priming. This finding
suggests that preferential processing of self-relevant information is mainly due to low-level features (e.g., high stimulus-
familiarity, emotional salience, etc.).
This perceptual self-preference might seem inconsistent with the commonly accepted semantic interpretation of the
‘‘self-reference effect” (SRE). SRE is a well-established finding that information encoded in relation to oneself is remembered
better than information encoded in other semantic contexts (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997;
Turk et al., 2008; see also Bergouignan, Nyberg, & Ehrsson, 2014). A common explanation of SRE is that the mental represen-
tation of the self is richer and has a more structured organization than mental representations of other objects; thus, a new
piece of information is more easily incorporated into the self-concept than into other concepts (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989;
Symons & Johnson, 1997). However, the ease by which information is semantically incorporated into the self-concept does
not mean the self-concept has to be accessed preferentially at the semantic level, which is what our results suggest. More
research is needed to shed light on this issue; however, our study clearly indicates that perceptual factors play a more impor-
tant role in the self-preferential processing than do semantic factors.
Notably, the ‘‘other” condition in our study referred to an unknown person who was not associated with any pre-existing
conceptual knowledge. Thus, the degree of semantic processing in this condition was initially very limited or even non-
existent. Nevertheless, we observed a very significant priming effect in this condition (see Fig. 1D; priming well above zero).
One possibility is that in the context of the ongoing experiment, the participants formed a task-specific semantic category
about the other-related stimuli, i.e., ‘‘someone whose name I see during this experiment”. Another possibility is that the
priming effect in the ‘‘other” condition corresponds to the so-called ‘‘response-priming effect” (e.g., Schmidt & Seydell,
2008). We cannot distinguish between these two interpretations, and it is also possible that they co-occurred. We can say
with certainty though that this effect was independent from the physical similarity of primes and targets; thus, it had to
be driven by post-perceptual factors. Importantly, none of these considerations has a consequence for the main conclusion
of the study, because increased pre-experimental semantic familiarity of the ‘‘other” condition (e.g., using celebrities’ names)
would only enhance priming in this condition and thus strengthen the interaction effect that we found.
Our second main finding is that conscious factors significantly contribute to the self-prioritization effect. This result has
interesting implications for the ‘‘Global Neuronal Workspace” (GNW) model of conscious access (Baars, 2002; Dehaene &
Changeux, 2011). According to GNW, there are two main computational spaces in the brain. One space is composed of a
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manner. The other space is a ‘‘global neuronal workspace,” consisting of a distributed set of cortical neurons receiving and
sending information to many cortical areas through long-range axons (Dehaene, Changeux, & Naccache, 2011). Conscious
access is said to proceed in two successive phases. In the first phase, lasting from approximately 100 to 300 ms, the stimulus
climbs up the cortical hierarchy of processors in a primarily bottom-up and non-conscious manner. In the second phase, if
the stimulus is selected for its adequacy to current goals and attention state, it is amplified in a top-down manner and
becomes maintained by sustained activity of a fraction of GNW neurons, i.e., a ‘‘broadcasting” mechanism (Dehaene et al.,
2011). We found that the behavioral facilitation related to awareness of self-processing was ‘‘above-and-beyond” the general
facilitation related to aware processing of other types of stimuli. This finding suggests that information relevant to the self
triggers some specific type of ‘‘broadcasting” that is more efficient than that for aware processing of different types of infor-
mation. Perhaps, because of a high familiarity and high behavioral relevance, self-related information evokes a faster, more
coherent, and more widespread pattern of neural connectivity, which increases the computational capacity of the ‘‘global
workspace” and leads to additional behavioral facilitation. Alternatively, aware access to self-concept (i.e., self-awareness)
could actually engage an additional computational workspace that is unavailable to general awareness. Such an additional
workspace would also increase the efficacy of conscious self-related processing. Future neuroimaging studies are needed to
shed more light on these fascinating questions.
We did not find any statistical support for unconscious self-preferential processing, even though such effects were sug-
gested by previous studies (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Bastuji, Perrin, & Garcia-Larrea, 2002; Geng et al., 2012; Pfister et al.,
2012; Wentura et al., 2005). In fact, it is generally difficult to provide any conclusive evidence on these unaware effects. That
is, a failure to detect them is statistically inconclusive, as it is only a negative finding. In turn, detecting such effects is incon-
clusive too because, consistent with a long tradition of psychophysical studies, the processing of a stimulus is regarded as
unaware if subjects are not able to report this stimulus with accuracy greater than chance. From a statistical point of view,
this reportability criterion in based on accepting a null hypothesis, which is clearly problematic. Thus, it could not be ruled
out that previous studies that demonstrated the ‘‘unconscious self-preference,” in fact, failed to create a completely unaware
context of information processing and their results were driven by a minimal, but sufficient, effect of awareness. This
impasse calls for a change in operationalization of unconscious processing where, unlike using absolute criteria, uncon-
sciousness is treated in relative terms (‘‘process A is more unconscious than process B,” rather than ‘‘process A is uncon-
scious”; Lau & Passingham, 2006; Overgaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006; Samaha, 2015). Consistent with this
view, even if the present study did not render masked stimuli completely unconscious, we were able to drastically reduce
the degree of conscious access and provide conclusive evidence that (i) aware factors contribute to preferential access to the
self-concept and (ii) that the ‘‘fully-aware self-preference” is stronger than the ‘‘partially-aware self-preference.” Thus, what
logically follows, the ‘‘fully-aware self-preference” has to be stronger than the ‘‘fully-unaware self-preference.”
In Experiment I, we found rather high d0 values for masked primes (i.e., approximately 1) and these d0 were significantly
higher than chance level. This result might mean that (i) over many trials some primes were processed fully consciously and
some completely unconsciously and that the ‘‘gradualness” of consciousness was only due to averaging across these trials or
(ii) that in each trial there was relatively ‘‘more consciousness” or ‘‘less consciousness” for a single act of perception. To
address this issue, we ran an additional experiment on eight naïve participants (see Supplementary Experiment S1). This
experiment was a replication of the visibility test from Experiment I, but for this experiment we used only masked trials,
and each trial was followed by an objective (forced-choice: ‘‘Self or other?”) and a subjective measure of consciousness
(‘‘On a scale from 1 to 5 indicate how well you saw the prime”). We found that the most common subjective ratings were
‘‘1” and ‘‘2” (25% and 43% of trials, respectively) and that the other ratings were also commonly used (‘‘3” in 17%, ‘‘4” in 7%,
and ‘‘5” in 7% of trials) (Fig. S1). This rather continuous distribution of responses suggests that the actual subjective experi-
ence was gradual. Experiment S1 also shows that the subjective visibility was very low, despite the relatively high objective
performance. Finally, in Experiment II the values of d0 for masked stimuli were very low, and they did not differ from the
chance level, yet we still found the exact same pattern of results as in Experiment I (d0 values approximately 1). Altogether,
this evidence shows that our masking procedure was highly effective in manipulating the level of conscious access.
One possible concern is that if the primes and targets in our study were subject to a spatiotemporal luminance summa-
tion, then our basic findings might have been driven by higher apparent contrast of the targets in the ‘‘self–self” condition.
The higher apparent contrast could lead to faster RTs, which hypothetically could replace our priming paradigm with
a direct perception paradigm. This possibility seems highly unlikely for two reasons: (i) all the presentation parameters in
our studies were closely matched in a factorial design, and (ii) we found significant differences between the ‘‘self–self”
and ‘‘other–other” perceptual conditions (in both cases, the primes and targets were identical; thus, even if any lumi-
nance summation took place, it should have had the same impact in both these trial types). However, to be absolutely sure
that not even some very subtle differences in low-level features affected our results we ran an additional control experiment,
where we used unmasked perceptual trials from the four conditions: ‘‘self–self,” ‘‘other–self,” ‘‘other–other,” and ‘‘self–ot
her” (see Supplementary Experiment S2). The participants performed a simple detection task (‘‘Respond as soon as you
see a target”), which requires only the perceptual analysis of stimuli, but no categorization or memory processes. We rea-
soned that if an apparent contrast could explain our original results then we should find a similar pattern of results even
in a detection task. In contrast, if priming explained our original findings, then all the effects should be absent in a detection
task. In line with the second possibility and our initial predictions, we did not find any significant effects in Experiment S2.
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of stimulus presentation could be particularly important for the processing of a subject’s own name. The auditory version of
this stimulus, not the visual one, is most often used in real-life social interactions. Indeed, the sound of one’s own name has
quite unique properties. Even 4- and 5-month-old infants differentiate the sound of their own name from other names
(Grossmann, Parise, & Friederici, 2010; Parise, Friederici, & Striano, 2010), and demented patients react to this stimulus even
when their perception of time and place is greatly deteriorated (Fishback, 1977). In contrast, the visual version of one’s own
name, not the auditory version, is used for communication via e-mail, chat, and letters. In fact, their own name is the first
lexical item that children learn to read and write (Levin, Both–De Vries, Aram, & Bus, 2005). Thus, the behavioral relevance of
visual and auditory versions of one’s own namemight not be so different after all. Importantly, we showed common patterns
of results for very different types of self-related material (name, surname, date of birth, initials, age, and nationality), which
suggests that our main findings were related to general features of self-related stimuli, rather than specifically to the
modality.
Importantly, our main conclusions are based on interaction effects; we showed that self-preferential processing occurs
more at perceptual than semantic, and more at conscious than unconscious, stages of information processing. These conclu-
sions would be problematic if in our study there was no semantic and/or no masked priming. For example, if there was a
general ‘‘floor effect” for masked priming, then it would be incorrect to conclude that ‘‘self-preference” was weaker during
unconscious than conscious processing, because there was probably no unconscious processing whatsoever (e.g., primes pre-
sented too briefly, or masked too heavily, to have any congruency effect on the following targets). However, visual inspection
of Figs. 1 and 2 indicates that this ‘‘floor effect” interpretation could not explain our results; all bars for semantic and masked
priming are well above zero. Statistical analyses confirmed this observation; masked and semantic priming for self- and for
other-related stimuli were all above zero, and these effects were highly significant (p < 0.0005 in all tests, in both experi-
ments). These results demonstrate that masked and semantic priming produced very robust effects in our study but still
the magnitude of these effects was similar for the ‘‘self” and the ‘‘other” condition.
Additionally, in both of our experiments we compared highly familiar stimuli (self-related) to unfamiliar stimuli (other-
related). Thus, it could be argued that our effects were driven by familiarity and had nothing to do with self-relevance per se.
This objection relates to the very basic question about what actually constitutes self-relevance. We think that familiarity is
one such constituting factor. Therefore, we do not treat familiarity as a confounding factor, but rather as an important aspect
of our effect of interest. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that familiarity alone has driven our main results (i.e., the interaction
effects) because (i) the degree of familiarity was perfectly matched between masked and unmasked trials, as well as between
perceptual and semantic trials, and (ii) familiarity alone would conceivably strengthen the degree of automaticity and thus
reduce the involvement of awareness (Bargh, 1994; Schneider & Chein, 2003), which is exactly the opposite to what we have
found for aware self-processing. Future studies more interested in the dissociation between familiarity and self-relevance
could compare aware vs. unaware (or perceptual vs. semantic) access to memory representations of the self and another
familiar person (the latter condition would be more matched to self-stimuli in terms of familiarity).
In summary, the present study shows that self-relevant stimuli are prioritized mainly at the perceptual and conscious
stages of stimulus processing hierarchy. This finding positions the ‘‘self-prioritization effect” somewhere between fully auto-
matic and fully controlled cognitive processes. Focusing on both these aspects and treating them in relative terms seems nec-
essary to better understand how our selves shape our perception of the world.
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